Lawfare: A Decisive Element of
21st-Century Conflicts?
By C h a r l e s J . D u n l a p , J r .

I
Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, is Deputy
Judge Advocate General, Headquarters U.S. Air
Force.

f anyone doubts the role of law in 21stcentury conflicts, one need only pose
the following question: what was the
U.S. military’s most serious setback
since 9/11? Few knowledgable experts would
say anything other than the detainee abuse
scandal known as “Abu Ghraib.” That this
strategic military disaster did not involve
force of arms, but rather centered on illegalities, indicates how law has evolved to become
a decisive element—and sometimes the decisive element—of contemporary conflicts.
It is not hard to understand why. Senior
commanders readily characterized Abu Ghraib
in customary military terms as “clearly a defeat”
because its effect is indistinguishable from that
imposed by traditional military clashes. No one
debates that the revelations energized the insurgency and profoundly undermined the ability

of U.S. forces to accomplish their mission.
The exploitation of the incident by adversaries
allowed it to become the perfect effects-based,
asymmetrical operation that continues to
present difficulties for American forces. In
early 2009, for instance, a senior Iraqi official
conceded that the name “Abu Ghraib” still left a
“bitter feeling inside Iraqis’ heart.”1
For international lawyers and others
involved in national security matters, the
transformational role of law is often captured
under the aegis of the term lawfare. In fact,
few concepts have risen more quickly to
prominence than lawfare. As recently as 2001,
there were only a handful of recorded uses of
the term, and none were in today’s context. By
2009, however, an Internet search produces
nearly 60,000 hits. Unfortunately, lawfare has
also generated its share of controversy.
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Taliban and al Qaeda use lawfare tactics by manipulating
unintended civilian casualties from airstrikes
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Law in Warfare
To the best of my knowledge, lawfare
as used in today’s context first appeared in
my 2001 essay for Harvard University’s Carr
Center.2 At that time, the term was defined
to mean “the use of law as a weapon of war”
and, more specifically, to describe “a method
of warfare where law is used as a means of
realizing a military objective.” Today, the
most refined definition is “the strategy of
using—or misusing—law as a substitute for
traditional military means to achieve an
operational objective.”3
The purpose of the lawfare conceptualization in the national security context is
to provide a vehicle that resonates readily
with nonlegal audiences, particularly in the
Armed Forces. Historically, the role of law in
armed conflict was variously presented, but
often simply as yet another requirement, one
to which adherence was a matter of integrity
and moral rectitude. As powerful as such
values may be as incentives, especially to the
militaries of liberal democracies, conceiving of the role of law in more conventional
military terms has its advantages. Understanding that the law can be wielded much
like a weapon by either side in a belligerency
is something to which a military member
can relate. It facilitates accounting for law,
and particularly the fact and perception of
adherence to it, in the planning and conduct
of operations.
While recognizing the ever-present
ethical responsibility to comply with the
law, how does transforming adherence to
law into a strategy serve the purposes of the
warfighter? The answer is found in the work
of Carl von Clausewitz. A man of his times,
Clausewitz had little regard for international
law as a factor in war.4 Nevertheless, he was
keenly aware of the political dimension, and
this is the linkage to today’s understanding of
lawfare.
Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is a
“continuation of political intercourse, carried
on with other means” relates directly to the
theoretical basis of lawfare.5 Moreover, his
analysis of the “trinity” of the people, government, and military whose “balance” produces
success in war is likewise instructive. Specifically, in modern democracies especially, maintaining the balance that “political intercourse”
requires depends largely upon adherence to
law in fact and, importantly, perception.
Legal experts Michael Reisman and
Chris Antoniou put it this way:
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In modern popular democracies, even a limited
armed conflict requires a substantial base of
public support. That support can erode or even
reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy
the political objective, if people believe that
the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.6
Some adversaries see opportunity in
this aspect of our political culture. Professor
William Eckhardt observes:
Knowing that our society so respects the rule
of law that it demands compliance with it, our
enemies carefully attack our military plans
as illegal and immoral and our execution of
those plans as contrary to the law of war. Our
vulnerability here is what philosopher of war
Carl von Clausewitz would term our “center of
gravity.” 7
In short, by anchoring lawfare in
Clausewitzean logic, military personnel—and
especially commanders of the militaries of
democracies—are able to recognize and internalize the importance of adherence to the rule
of law as a practical and necessary element of
mission accomplishment. They need not particularly embrace its philosophical, ethical, or
moral foundations; they can be Machiavellian
in their attitude toward law because adherence
to it serves wholly pragmatic needs. Thus,

tion mediums, from round-the-clock news
sources to cell phone cameras that empower
almost anyone to record events, and it is
easy to understand why incidents that seemingly implicate the international law of war
can rapidly have significant ramifications
among the body politic.
Commanders today, keenly aware of the
devastating impact on operations that incidents such as Abu Ghraib can have, typically
are willing partners in efforts to ensure that
compliance with the law is part and parcel of
their activities. It is no surprise, for example,
that the much-heralded counterinsurgency
manual devotes a considerable amount of
text to law and law-related considerations.9
Counterinsurgency and other contemporary
“irregular warfare” situations are especially
sensitive to illegalities that can undermine
the efforts to legitimize the government (and
those wishing to assist it) that the insurgency
is aiming to topple.
The new counterinsurgency doctrine
also emphasizes that lawfare is more than
just something adversaries seek to use against
law-abiding societies; it is a resource that
democratic militaries can—and should—
employ affirmatively. For example, the
reestablishment of the rule of law is a wellunderstood component of counterinsurgency
and has proven an important part of the
success U.S. forces have enjoyed in Iraq.10

Clausewitz was keenly aware of war’s political dimension, and
this is the linkage to today’s understanding of lawfare
the concept of lawfare aims to insinuate law
into military thinking in a new way, one that
rationalizes it in terms compatible with the
realities of 21st-century operations.

Legal “Weaponry”
The new emphasis on law in war
derives from the larger, worldwide legal revolution. George Will recently characterized
the United States as the “Litigation Nation”
to describe how deeply legal consciousness
has penetrated American society.8 Furthermore, international commerce depends
upon law, along with a variety of international forums, to operate efficiently. This, in
turn, is accelerating a globalization of law.
As international law generally penetrates
modern life, it tends to influence, as other
trends have, the way war is conducted. Add
to that the enormous impact of informa-

There are other examples of how legal
instruments can substitute for military means
and function as an affirmative good. To
illustrate: during the early stages of operations in Afghanistan, a legal “weapon”—a
contract—was used to deny potentially valuable military information (derived from commercially available satellite imagery) from
hostile forces.11 In addition, although strategists argue that 21st-century threats emerge
most frequently from nonstate actors who
often operate outside of the law, these actors
are still vulnerable to its application. Legal
“weaponry,” for instance, may well be the
most effective means of attacking the financial networks terrorist organizations require
to function. Likewise, sanctions and other
legal methodologies can isolate insurgencies from the external support many experts
believe is essential to victory.
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While the employment of legal methodologies can create offensive opportunities for
savvy U.S. commanders, too frequently our
opponents use an exploitative form of lawfare
along the lines of that arising in Abu Ghraib’s
aftermath. In fact, lawfare has emerged as the
principal effects-based air defense methodology employed by America’s adversaries today.
Nowhere is this truer than in Afghanistan,
where the Taliban and al Qaeda are proving
themselves sophisticated and effective lawfare
practitioners.
Specifically, the Taliban and al Qaeda
are attempting to demonize the air weapon
through the manipulation of the unintended
civilian casualties airstrikes can produce. Their
reason is obvious: precision air attacks are the
most potent weapon they face. In June 2008,
the Washington Times reported a Taliban
fighter’s lament that “tanks and armor are not
a big deal. The fighters are the killers. I can
handle everything but the jet fighters.”12 More
recently, Newsweek told of a Taliban commander who, visiting the site of an attack by
a Predator drone, marveled at how a “direct
hit” was scored on the exact room an al Qaeda
operative was using, leading the publication
to conclude that a “barrage of pinpoint strikes
may be unsettling al Qaeda.”13
Yet the enemy is fighting back by
mounting a massive—and increasingly effective—lawfare campaign. Using the media,
they seek to create the perception, especially

among Afghanis, that the war is being waged
in an “unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.”14
Unfortunately, some well-intended efforts at
countering the adversary’s lawfare blitz are
proving counterproductive. For example, in
June 2007, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) spokesman in Afghanistan
insisted that the Alliance “would not fire
on positions if it knew there were civilians
nearby.”15 A little more than a year later,
another NATO spokesman went even further,
stating that if “there is the likelihood of even
one civilian casualty, we will not strike, not
even if we think Osama bin Laden is down
there.”16 The law of war certainly does not

lawfare has emerged as
the principal effects-based
air defense methodology
employed by America’s
adversaries
require zero civilian casualties; rather, it only
requires that they not be excessive in relation
to the military advantage sought.
Regardless, NATO’s pronouncements
unintentionally telegraphed an opportunity
for lawfare-based strategy by which the
enemy could avoid (or manipulate) airstrikes.
That strategy is in effect today as evidenced
by a November 2008 report wherein U.S.
officers advised that the Taliban is “delib-

Courtroom sketch of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and
four other alleged September 11 co-conspirators
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erately increasing the risk to civilians” by
locating themselves among them.17 In terms
of manipulation, consider an incident in
which the Taliban, according to an American
official, held a wedding party hostage as they
fired on U.S. forces in an “attack designed to
draw airstrikes on civilians and stoke antiAmerican sentiment.”18
What is frustrating is the fact that revolutionary advances in aerial surveillance technologies and precision munitions have made
airstrikes, in the words of Marc Garlasco of
Human Rights Watch, “probably the most
discriminating weapon that exists.”19 The
problem concerns perceptions. Accordingly,
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Secretary-General
of NATO, correctly recognizes that perceptions are a “strategic battleground” and wants
to “prioritize strategic communications” to
remind the world “that the Taliban remain
the ruthless killers and abusers of human
rights that they have always been.”20
The Taliban is not the only adversary
employing abusive lawfare tactics. In their air
and ground operations in Gaza in late 2008
and early 2009, the Israelis faced a foe who,
according to Israeli officials, flouted international law in an unprecedented manner.
Specifically, the New York Times reported:
Hamas rocket and weapons caches, including
rocket launchers, have been discovered in and
under mosques, schools and civilian homes, the
[Israeli] army says. The Israeli intelligence chief,
Yuval Diskin, in a report to the Israeli cabinet,
said that the Gaza-based leadership of Hamas
was in underground housing beneath the No. 2
building of Shifa Hospital, the largest in Gaza.21
It appears that based on its experiences
in the 2006 Lebanon War, the Israelis made
careful and innovative counter-lawfare preparations for the Gaza operation. Besides using
“meticulous technical and human intelligence”
to validate targets—as well as employing low
collateral damage munitions in strikes—the
Israelis also subjected plans to review by
military lawyers “huddling in war rooms.”22
In addition, Israel “distributed hundreds of
thousands of leaflets and used its intelligence
on cell phone networks in Gaza to issue warnings to civilians, including phone calls to some
families in high-risk areas.”23
Perhaps of most interest is the implementation of a concept called “operational
verification.”24 According to Defense News,
almost every Israeli army unit has specially
ndupres s . ndu. edu
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be a “spectacular” failure.30 In short, adherence
to the rule of law does not present the military
disadvantage so many assume.
Next, the commander must be concerned with “legal preparation of the battlespace.” This means that command must
ensure that troops have been properly trained
to understand the law applicable to the operation and are ready to apply it under extreme
stress. In this regard, the 2007 Department
of Defense study of Soldiers and Marines

trained teams equipped with video cameras,
tape recorders, and other documentation
gear. The aim is to “document the story in
real time” while there is still a “chance to
influence public opinion” about the conduct
of the operation.
Anthony Cordesman argues that
although he believes that Israel did not
violate the law of war and made a “systematic effort to limit collateral damage,” there
was nevertheless “almost constant negative
coverage of Israel in the Arab and Islamic
world, as well as in much of Europe,” despite
Israel’s efforts.25 Consequently, as Der Spiegel
reported, Israeli officials are “gearing up for
a wave of lawsuits from around the world”
claiming violations of the law of war.26 Other
news agencies report that the Israeli government is vowing to defend its soldiers against
legal attack. Interestingly, Der Spiegel characterized the expected legal action in what
are in effect lawfare terms in paraphrased
Clausewitzian language as a “continuation of
the war with legal means.”27

almost every Israeli army unit has specially trained teams
equipped with video cameras, tape recorders, and other
documentation gear
in Iraq is troubling as it revealed that only
“47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of
Marines agreed that non-combatants should
be treated with dignity and respect, and that
well over a third of all soldiers and Marines
reported that torture should be allowed to
save the life of a fellow soldier or Marine.”31
Although intensive training and strong
leadership may mitigate such attitudes,
experts doubt such efforts can wholly prevent
incidents from occurring.32 Furthermore,
Stephen Ambrose observed that it is a “universal aspect of war” that when young troops
are put “in a foreign country with weapons
in their hands, sometimes terrible things
happen that you wish had never happened.”33
This could suggest that the best way
to avoid incidents is to limit the number of
troops on the ground. Supporting this con-

Operationalizing Law
What does all this mean for commanders in 21st-century conflicts? In the first
place, it is imperative that warfighters reject
interpretations of lawfare that cast the law as
a villain. A better, more realistic assessment is
set forth by attorney Nathanial Burney:
[Lawfare] is often misused by those who claim
that there is too much law, and that the application of law to military matters is a bad thing
that hamstrings commanders in the field. The
fact of the matter is that lawfare is out there; it
happens. It is not inherently good or bad. . . .
It might be wiser for such critics to take it
into account, and use it effectively themselves,
rather than wish it didn’t exist.28
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Legal preparation of the battlespace also
requires robust efforts to educate the media as
to what the law does—and does not—require.
Adversaries today are clever in their relations
with the global media, and U.S. forces must be
able to respond as quickly (and ideally before
inquiries are made) and transparently as possible to lawfare-related incidents. Relationships
with the media must be built in advance; once
an incident occurs, it is difficult to explain
legal complexities or to demonstrate the efforts
to avoid unnecessary civilian losses on a timeline that will be meaningful.
Commanders would be wise to emulate
the Israeli initiative by establishing “operational
verification” teams to record activity in real time
in instances where the adversary is employing an effects-based lawfare strategy centered
around allegations of war crimes. In any event,

Marine combat photographer videotapes Marines conducting searches of Iraqi males
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Besides the fact that law may sometimes
offer ways of bloodlessly achieving operational
objectives, it is simply historically untrue that
totalitarians who operate outside of humanitarian norms that the law reflects are more likely
to succeed. Scholar Victor Davis Hanson points
out that the basis for the enormous success of
Western militaries is their adherence to constitutional government and respect for individual
freedoms, and constant external audit and
oversight of their strategy and tactics.29 Historian Caleb Carr goes a step further by insisting
that the “strategy of terror” of waging war
against civilians nearly always has proven to

clusion is a September 2008 report by Human
Rights Watch that found that civilian casualties “rarely occur during planned airstrikes
on suspected Taliban targets” but rather
“almost always occurred during the fluid,
rapid-response strikes, often carried out in
support of ground troops.”34 Thus, small-footprint operations can limit the risk to civilians,
as well as limit the adversary’s opportunity
for lawfare-exploitable events with strategic
consequences.

issue 54, 3 d quarter 2009 / JFQ     37

SPECIAL FEATURE | Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts?
multidisciplinary teams of legal, operational,
intelligence, and public affairs specialists ought
to be organized, trained, and equipped to
rapidly investigate allegations of incidents of
high collateral damage. Likewise, command
and control systems ought to be evaluated for
their ability to record data for the purpose of
accurately reconstructing processes if required.
“Operational verification” teams could
be more than simply sophisticated elements
of an information operations effort. Properly
organized, trained, and equipped, they can
fulfill legitimate public diplomacy needs,
but they can also provide near-real-time
feedback to commanders as to how operations are being executed. Thus, commanders
could rapidly adapt procedures if the empirical data gathered by such teams indicate
opportunities to better protect innocents.
Of course, the availability of expert legal
advice is absolutely necessary in the age of
lawfare. The military lawyers (judge advocates)
responsible for providing advice for combat
operations need schooling not only in the law,
but also in the characteristics of the weapons
to be used, as well as the strategies for their
employment. Importantly, commanders must
make it unequivocally clear to their forces that
they intend to conduct operations in strict
adherence to the law. Helping commanders do
so is the job of the judge advocate.
Assuring troops of the legal and moral
validity of their actions adds to combat
power. In discussing the role of judge advocates, Richard Schragger points out:
Instead of seeing law as a barrier to the exercise
of the client’s power, [military lawyers] under-

stand the law as a prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of power. . . . Law makes just wars
possible by creating a well-defined legal space
within which individual soldiers can act without
resorting to their own personal moral codes.35

according to your rules? No. War has rules,
but those rules are set by the West. . . . [I]f
you use those rules, then weak countries have
no chance.”36
To counter such beliefs, it is an essential
lawfare technique to look for touchstones
within the culture of the target audience. For
example, in the early 1990s, the International
Committee of the Red Cross produced an
illustrated paperback that matched key provisions of the Geneva Convention “with bits of
traditional Arab and Islamic wisdom.”37 Such
innovations ought to be reexamined, along
with creative ideas that would get the messages
to the target audience. One way might be to
provide audio cassettes in local languages that
espouse what are really Geneva Convention
values in a context and manner that fit with
community religious and cultural imperatives.
The point is to delegitimize the enemy
in the eyes of the host nation populace.
This is most effectively accomplished when
respected indigenous authorities lead the
effort. Consider Thomas Friedman’s favorable assessment of the condemnation by
Indian Muslim leaders of the November 2008
Mumbai attacks:

That said, commanders should aim
not to have a judge advocate at the elbow of
every rifleman, but rather to imbue troops
with the right behaviors so they instinctively
do the right thing on the battlefield. The
most effective way is to carefully explain
the enemy’s lawfare strategies and highlight
the pragmatic, real-world impact of Abu
Ghraib–type incidents on the overall success
of the mission. One of the most powerful
motivators of troop conduct is the desire

commanders must make it
unequivocally clear to their
forces that they intend to
conduct operations in strict
adherence to the law
to enhance the security of fellow soldiers.
Making the connection between adherence
to law and troop safety is a critical leadership task.
Integral to defensive lawfare operations
is the education of the host nation population
and, in effect, the enemy themselves. In many
21st-century battlespaces, these audiences
are not receptive to what may appear as law
imposed by the West. In 1999, for example, a
Chinese colonel famously argued that China
was “a weak country, so do we need to fight

The only effective way to stop [terrorism] is for
“the village”—the Muslim community itself—
to say “no more.” When a culture and a faith
community delegitimize this kind of behavior,
openly, loudly and consistently, it is more important than metal detectors or extra police.38
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BG Michael A. Ryan, U.S. Forces
Afghanistan, offers condolences
to families of those killed during
an operation targeting insurgents,
February 2009
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Moreover, it should not be forgotten
that much of the success in suppressing
violence in Iraq was achieved when Sunnis in
Anbar Province and other areas realized that
al Qaeda operatives were acting contrary to
Iraqi, and indeed Islamic, sensibilities, values,
and law. It also may be possible to use educational techniques to change the attitudes of
enemy fighters as well.
Finally, some critics believe that
“lawfare” is a code to condemn anyone who
attempts to use the courts to resolve national
security issues. For example, lawyer-turnedjournalist Scott Horton charged in the July
2007 issue of Harper’s Magazine that “lawfare
theorists” reason that lawyers who present
war-related claims in court “might as well
be terrorists themselves.”39 Though there are
those who object to the way the courts have
been used by some litigants,40 it is legally and
morally wrong to paint anyone legitimately
using legal processes as the “enemy.”
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Indeed, the courageous use of the courts
on behalf of unpopular clients, along with the
insistence that even our vilest enemies must
be afforded due process of law, is a deeply
embedded American value, and the kind of
principle the Armed Forces exist to preserve.
To be clear, recourse to the courts and other
legal processes is to be encouraged; if there are
abuses, the courts are well equipped to deal
with them. It is always better to wage legal
battles, however vicious, than it is to fight
battles with the lives of young Americans.
Lawfare has become such an indelible feature of 21st-century conflicts that
commanders dismiss it at their peril. Key
leaders recognize this evolution. General
James Jones, USMC (Ret.), the Nation’s new
National Security Advisor, observed several
years ago that the nature of war has changed.
“It’s become very legalistic and very complex,”
he said, adding that now “you have to have
a lawyer or a dozen.”41 Lawfare, of course, is
about more than lawyers; it is about the rule
of law and its relation to war.
While it is true, as Professor Eckhardt
maintains, that adherence to the rule of law
is a “center of gravity” for democratic societies such as ours—and certainly there are
those who will try to turn that virtue into a
vulnerability—we still can never forget that it
is also a vital source of our great strength as a
nation.42 We can—and must—meet the challenge of lawfare as effectively and aggressively
as we have met every other issue critical to
our national security. JFQ
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